In the psychology of thinking, little thought is given to what constitutes good thinking. Instead, normative solutions to problems have been accepted at face value, thereby determining what counts as a reasoning fallacy. I applaud Vranas (Cognition 76 (2000) 179) for thinking seriously about norms. I do, however, disagree with his attempt to provide post hoc justi®cations for supposed reasoning fallacies in terms of`content-neutral' norms. Norms need to be constructed for a speci®c situation, not imposed upon it in a contentblind way. The reason is that content-blind norms disregard relevant structural properties of the given situation, including polysemy, reference classes, and sampling. I also show that content-blind norms can, unwittingly, lead to double standards: the norm in one problem is the fallacy in the next. The alternative to content-blind norms is not no norms, but rather carefully designed norms. q
Introduction
A psychiatrist I know prescribes Prozac to his depressive patients. As do many drugs, Prozac has side effects. My friend used to inform each patient that he or she had a 30±50% probability of developing a sexual problem such as the loss of libido or peripheral malfunctioning. Upon hearing this, patients became concerned and anxious. After learning of our research on how to help people understand uncertainties, the psychiatrist changed his method of communicating risks to his patients. He 
